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The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and
Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity
john a. powell*
[W]e are all androgynous, not only because we are all born of a
woman impregnated by the seed of a man but because each of us, helplessly and forever, containsthe other-male in female, female in male,
white in black, and black in white. We are a part of each other...
[Nione of us can do anythingabout it.
-James Baldwin'

I frequently have difficulty sorting out how to think
about a number of issues in my life. The problem is not so
much that I do not know what I think and feel. Instead, it is
that I think and feel many different and conflicting things2
and I do not have the capacity to simply sort them out.

Sometimes, I let the different voices engage each other in a
dialogue and find an intrasubjective solution. Other times I
allow the discordance to exist. Often, I engaged my friend
Trina Grillo in the discussion. Trina was, and is, not just a
good friend; she is a part of the multiple aspects that constitute me. In the sorting process, Trina did more than help me
identify existing voices. She often helped me create new
voices that somehow made deep claims upon me, upon us.

* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Executive Director, Institute on Race and Poverty. I greatly appreciate the research assistance of Gavin Kearney. I also thank Dr. Donna Waters for her suggestions,
and Sandy Levitsky and the Minnesota Law Review for publishing this tribute
in memory of Professor Trina Grillo. I cannot express how important Trina
was, and is, to me. Thank you, Trina-with love, john.
1. JAMES BALDWIN, Here Be Dragons, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET:

COLLECTED NONFICTION 1948-85, 677, 690 (1985).

2. Kenneth Gergen talks about the difficulty of choosing between competing voices or claims made upon oneself. He argues that there are multiple
selves, each of which makes its own claims and demands. Implicit in this argument is that the notion of the unitary self has been fractured. While Gergen attributes this sort of fracturing to environmental and technological
changes, as this Essay will make evident, others see it as the very nature of
existence and/or discourse. See KENNETH J. GERGEN, THE SATURATED SELF:
DILEMMAS OF IDENTITY IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE (1991).
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She helped create the spaces where the silence laced between
and within the voices could be heard.
The dominant narrative of Western society would find what
I have just written problematic, and perhaps unintelligible.
This narrative, purporting to be a meta-narrative, denies that
we are or can be multiple and fractured and still remain
"normal."3 It makes many claims upon us regarding the nature
of the individual. In fact, its individualistic focus is one of the
deeply rooted ideologies of Western society. It is an "ideology"
in the sense that Iris Young defines ideology: a set of ideals
that "helps to reproduce relations of domination or oppression
by justifying them or by obscuring possible more emancipatory
social relations."4
In this Essay I attempt to highlight some of the ways that
the ideals of individualism, the individual, and the self are
used to destructively frame the ways we talk about the self and
race. As a necessary premise of this task, I begin by examining
the Western vision of the self, the individualistic norm that
pervades our society. By questioning this largely unexamined
norm, I invite the reader to look at what has been traditionally
5
excluded.

3. Theories of language assert that one of the powers of language is its
ability to determine that which is considered normal and that which is considered abnormal. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (Tavistock
Publications Ltd. 1970) (1966).
4. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 112
(1990).
5. Toni Morrison states that in dealing with matters of race and racial
practices, it is important to look at not only what is present, but what is absent, what has been excluded. She also discusses how her understanding of
the role of race in American literature fundamentally shifted when she began
to focus on the writers' use of structures and device, how she felt as though
she had been looking at a bunch of goldfish all of her life and suddenly noticed

the fish bowl.

TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARIc WHITrENESS AND THE
LITERARY IMAGINATION 13-16 (1992). I have similarly described the role of

the public interest lawyer to include making the invisible visible. See john a.
powell, Righting the Law: Seeking a Humane Voice, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 333,
344 (1993-1994) (explaining that public interest lawyers must look to both the
needs of individual clients and to the invisible forces which situate clients in a
larger social context). One of the ways that dominant narratives and ideologies work to subordinate is by making the social causes of subordination seem
natural and inevitable, that is, to make the practices invisible. See generally
YOUNG, supra note 4. My goal is to help expose the unexposed; in a sense, to
help us see the fishbowl.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasingly in the twentieth century, the modernist notion of the self as unitary, stable, and transparent has come
under criticism. Although rumblings of dissension have been
building for more than 200 years, the advent of postmodernism
in general, and the insightful criticism of feminist thinkers in
particular, have sounded the death knell for this concept of the
self.6 By positing a contrasting antiessentialist, intersectional
self, Trina Grillo and her contemporaries (such as Angela Harris, Kimberl6 Crenshaw, and Patricia Williams) have made great
strides in pushing the dialogue on identity and the subject beyond those traditional concepts (including early feminist renditions) that have functioned to marginalize and subjugate oppressed groups. This rejection of the unitary modernist self
has in turn led to vast and fundamental criticisms of our legal
system, which is predicated on the individual, autonomous self.
These criticisms assert that, by grounding legal doctrines on a
conception of the self or subject that at best only describes the
to
White male, our legal system has consistently functioned
7
create and perpetuate the privilege of White males.
At the base of the criticisms of Grillo and other feminists is
the reformulation of the self as a site constituted and fragmented, at least partially, by the intersections of various categories of domination/oppression such as race, gender, and sexual orientation.' Thus, far from being a unitary and static
phenomenon untainted by experience, one's core identity is
made up of the various discourses and structures that shape
society and one's experience within it. Many feminists and
postmodernists have taken this argument one step further and
asserted that the self is by its very nature fragmented: an illu-

6. As a linguistic convenience, this Essay will use the overly general
terms "feminism" and "postmodernism." In doing so, my intent is not to assert that there is a single voice or vantage point for either of these categories,
or that these categories are in any way mutually exclusive. Instead, I wish
only to avoid being paralyzed by the task of articulating the infinite nuances
and wrinkles that exist within and among them.
7. See infra Part IV (reviewing criticisms of the modem conception of
the legal subject and arguing that this conception serves to perpetuate White
male privilege).
8. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, Antiessentialism and Intersectionality:Tools to
Dismantle the Master's House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 17-19 (1995)
(describing the intersectionality critique). This conception of the self will be
presented in greater detail in Part 11 infra.
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sory notion constructed as static and unitary, but in reality
completely fluid.'
Building upon theories of feminism and postmodernism,
this Essay will attempt to advance the dialogue of the self by
addressing some problems that have proceeded from the deconstruction and decentering of the Western self. The tensions
between modernism and postmodernism are often framed in
terms of essentialism and antiessentialism. Feminism in general, and the intersectional thesis in particular, have been
ambivalent on this essentialist/antiessentialist issue. I examine some of the issues concerning this debate and try to expose
some of the limitations of each position. I also try to demonstrate how the positions often rely on a shared historical and
conceptual tradition that does not exhaust useful ways of examining this issue and the self. Drawing on a reconceptualization of the intersectional thesis, I try to show that resolving
the essentialist/antiessentialist debate is not a mandatory precondition for accepting intersectionalism's claim of a decentered nonunitary self. Finally, I try to suggest some of the legal implications of an intersectional nonunitary self.
The essential, unitary, and static self has come under serious attack. This critique leaves the self decentered, fractured
and possibly multiple. This attack does not, however, mandate
that there is no essential self.'" Such a conclusion falls prey to
a kind of reasoning that Richard Bernstein has referred to as
the "grand and seductive Either/Or."" Although antiessentialists may ultimately be right, I think that it is incorrect to assert that either the self possesses the Western liberal essence

9. See, e.g., Katherine P. Ewing, The Illusion of Wholeness: Culture, Self,
and the Experience of Inconsistency, 18 ETHOS 251, 251 (1990) (arguing that

people "project multiple, inconsistent self-representations that are contextdependent and may shift rapidly"); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Unbear-

able Lightness of Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 207, 211 (1996)

(arguing that the problem with any general theory of identity "is that 'identity
itself has little substance"); Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern Identity and the Le-

gal Subject, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 455, 463 (1991) (noting that a postmodern

conception of identity recognizes the self as fragmented and captures "its fissuring by the myriad social discourses which construct it").
10. The attack on the essential self is part of a larger anti-foundationalism
that challenges the notion that there is anything that is essential. It is also part
of a tradition started by liberalism that denies that there is such a thing as intelligible essence. See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS (1984).
11. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJEcTMSM AND RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAxIS 18 (1983).
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or it possesses no essence whatsoever; multiplicity and essentialism are not mutually exclusive.12
There are a number of presentations that share with postmodernists and feminists the assertion that the self is constructed and fractured, but do not share the claim that all is constructed, leaving nothing essential or unconditional. Although
these presentations are numerous, this Essay will focus upon
two in particular: the psychoanalytic self, and the Buddhist theory of the self and the uncondition. 13 My goal is not to advocate
any particular notion of identity. Rather, I intend to show that
there is a general consensus among those who think critically
about the self that the modernist self-that is, the Western,
unitary, autonomous self-is simply wrong. Furthermore,
while there is an intense debate about the nature of the self
that should replace the early commentaries, resolving this debate is not critical in addressing some implications of how we
construct and use the law. I want to emphasize the need for
caution in how we operate within the discursive void left by the
demise of the modern self.
From a jurisprudential standpoint, the implications of rejecting the unitary self are immense and pervasive. While it is
impossible to know the myriad ways in which this rejection will
impact the law, it is certain that the implications will go to the
law's very foundations. In this Essay I briefly sketch out some
of the legal ramifications of the multiple self, particularly in
relation to how the law approaches racism. Part I provides an
overview of the origins and conception of the Western self.
Part II focuses upon various challenges to the modern self, including the intersectional self that has been advanced by
Grillo, Harris, Williams, and Crenshaw. Part Ill presents the
Freudian and Buddhist conceptions of the self and no self.
These concepts of the self share the postmodern position that
the self is not unitary, while adopting different positions on the
strong antiessentialism of postmodernism. I will show how
they attempt to avoid some of the flaws of modernism regard-

12. Nietzsche was one of the first Western philosophers to claim that the
self is constructed, multiple, and yet, in part, essential nonetheless. See
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS 76 (R.J. Hollingdale trans.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1983) (arguing that in constructing a self we cannot
banish history or inheritance, but must instead "confront our inherited and
hereditary nature with our knowledge of it").
13. Again I must acknowledge that these terms are overly broad. Psychoanalysts and Buddhists have posited many different versions of the self.
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ing the self. Finally, Part IV addresses some of the legal implications of the move toward a multiple self.
I. THE MODERN SELF
Before the Renaissance, Western society defined the self
by its location within both a "secular and divine order." 14 The
center of pre-modern epistemology was "the great chain of be-5
ing," in which all members of society had a proper place.'
With the rise of Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment, however, the individual began to be conceived as sovereign and epistemologically central. 6 This reconfiguration of
the self, spurred by historical events such as the Protestant
Reformation and the scientific revolution, 7 ultimately led to
the systematic examination of the modern self. Although many
participated, four of the more influential theorists were Immanuel Kant, Rene Descartes, John Locke, and more recently,
John Rawls.
Kant asserted that the definitive characteristic of the human self was its capacity for reason. Reason allowed the self to
understand and order the world with certainty. According to
Kant, "[R]eason is the faculty which supplies the principles of a
priori knowledge,"' 8 and "pure a prioriprinciples are indispensable for the possibility of experience,... [flor whence could
14. Stuart Hall, The Questionof CulturalIdentity, in MODERNITY AND ITS
FUTURES 595, 602 (Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1992).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 602-03. It bears mentioning that, although this notion of the
sovereign and essential self had important implications for the liberation of
those oppressed by pre-modern society, many of the principle proponents of
this self felt that it only inhered in White Europeans. For example, David
Hume asserted that "negroes" were akin to parrots in their intellectual capacities, only capable of mimicry; similarly Immanuel Kant felt that Blacks
were intellectually inferior, and John Stuart Mill believed that Blacks lacked
the capacity for self-government. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE:
PLOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF MEANING 6 (1993).

17. Given that the discoveries of the scientific revolution fueled the modernist belief that man could order reality, it is interesting to note that many of
the fundamental "truths" of the scientific revolution are now considered incorrect. For example, the linearity ,of time, one of the so-called "dimensions" of
reality, is now in disrepute as linear concepts of time create "boundaries that
breed contradictions in the laws of science." William V. Dunning, PostModernism and the Construct of the Divisible Self, 33 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS
132, 135 (1993) (describing Stephen Hawking's avoidance of a linear concept
of time).
18. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 58 (Norman Kemp

Smith trans., St. Martin's Press 1968).
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experience derive its certainty, if all the rules, according to
which it proceeds, were always themselves empirical, and
therefore contingent?" 9 Defining humans by their capacity for
a priorireasoning reveals that the essence of the Kantian self
is individual and imperviousness to experience (i.e., static).
Kant deduced further that this self he envisioned was unitary:
The thought that the representations given in intuition one in all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in
one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; ... For otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself.2

Proceeding from the notion of a unitary self or self-consciousness 21
governed by a capacity for reason that is unaffected by the particularities of experience, Kant felt that "pure reason" both enabled and compelled humans to construct a "transcendental
philosophy" that articulated the structure and order of the experiential world.'
A predecessor of Kant, Descartes viewed the self in much
the same fashion as Kant. He too felt that the capacity for
reason was the definitive characteristic of the human self:
"[Als to reason or sense,.., it is that alone which constitutes
us men."2 3 Furthermore, Descartes saw this essential characteristic of man as "by nature equal in all men."24 Thus, all
differences among humans were trivial, because "the difference of greater and less holds only among the accidents, and
not among the forms or natures of individuals of the same
species."25 Like Kant, Descartes believed that reason contained the capacity for knowing and ordering the world. He
constructed his epistemology upon the foundation of his

19. Id. at 45.
20. Id. at 154. It is interesting to note that here Kant considers and
quickly dismisses the notion of a multiple self as inconceivable.
21. There is a subtle difference between the notion of the self and the notion of self-consciousness. It is a difference that is not always recognized and
attended to in liberalism. Indeed, it was Descartes's epistemology that asserted that self-consciousness was proof of a self. See infra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text (quoting Descartes).
22. See KANT, supra note 18, at 60 (explaining that "[tiranscendental
philosophy is only the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure reason
has to lay down the complete architectonic plan").
23. RENE DESCARTES, A DIscouRsE ON METHOD AND SELECTED WRITINGs
2 (John Veitch trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951).
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 2.
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awareness
of his own existence via the maxim, "Cogito ergo
26
sum."

Locke shared with Kant and Descartes the belief that humans were essentially individualistic and defined by their capacity for reason.2 1 Moreover, Locke posited that society ought
to be ordered along the lines of a social contract. All men, by
virtue of their reason, would assent to this contract insofar as
it governed social relations in a manner28 that enabled men to
most freely pursue their individual ends.
John Rawls, a late modern theorist, provides an explicit
example of this social contract theory in practice. 29 Proceeding
from the modern conception of the self as essentially autonomous and a priori,Rawls endeavored to articulate a process for
ordering a just society.3° The key to this process was the notion
of the "original position," a position where individuals could
consider principles of justice in their bare essence, without the
benefit or detriment of bias acquired through awareness of social constructions.31 From this hypothetical position, Rawls
believed that one could ascertain those principles that are most
fair for ordering society because the principles would be created without regard to any "arbitrary contingencies."3 2 Rawls
26. Translated, "I think therefore I am." RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE
ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON AND SEEKING FOR
TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES 21 (David Weissman ed., 1996).
27. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 9
(A.S. Pringle-Pattison ed., Humanities Press 1978) (explaining that "it is the
understandingthat sets man above the rest of sensible beings").
28. Locke was also a theist whose humanism led him to conclude that
"the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men,... and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can
be good or valid against it." JOHN LOCKE, TREATISE OF CiviL GOVERNMENT 90
(C.L. Sherman ed., 1937).
29. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
30. Rawls's theory tries to avoid the philosophical question of the nature
of the self. He does this by trying to maintain a neutral position on the ontological question, and instead attempts to advance a political theory that would
accommodate various notions of the self. Id. at 18-19. His critics claim that
Rawls, like Kant before him, fails in this effort. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITs OF JUSTICE 11 (1982) (arguing that while Rawls
envisions the principles of justice as emerging from deliberations, no real deliberation would be possible where the parties have no basis for disagreement); see also SEYLA BENHABB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMuNrrY,
AND POSTMODERNISM 161-69 (1992).
31. RAWLS, supra note 29, at 141. The assumption Rawls makes is that
"[i]f a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the outcome is biased by arbitrary contingencies." Id.
32. Id.
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referred to this exercise as a collective one. Nevertheless, Michael Sandel notes that if one accepts the premise that humans
are essentially autonomous and rational as unaffected by experience, then the proper ordering of society is really univocal
and solitary.3 3 Thus, in Rawls we see the basis for the modern
jurisprudential ideal that the law proceeds from fundamental
truths about the essence of humans, and need not-in fact,
ought not-take account of the particularities of various individuals. 34 It is this view of the self that places individual
rights
35
ahead of societal good in deontological liberalism.
Although the modern conception of the self aspires to a
universality independent of experience, it is at least in part 36
a
response to an earlier socio-historical conception of the self.

Moreover, even as these universal claims regarding the self
were defining the modern era, they were subject to critique.
For example, David Hume argued that the self was nonexistent, an imaginary referent that we construct in an attempt to
order the incessant stream of sensations we experience:
But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our
several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If
any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must
continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives;
since self is supposed to exist after
37 that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable.

Furthermore, Hume maintained that this illusion of the self
was only made possible by certain artifices of the mind: "Tis,
therefore, on some of these three relations of resemblance,
contiguity and causation, that identity depends; ... our notions
of personal identity proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected
ideas, according to the principles."38

33.

SANDEL, supra note 30, at 129.

34. See infra Part IV (discussing the impact of the modern self on the
law).
35. See RAWLS, supra note 29, at 3-4 (arguing that in a just society "[e]ach
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override"); SANDEL, supra note 30, at 2-7 (arguing
that the concepts of self as independent of its object and of the right as prior
to the good are essential to the deontological vision).
36. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing modern
theories of self).
37. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE 251 (L.A. Selby-Bigge
ed., 1888).
38. Id. at 260. Hume felt that the memory actually produced identity by
linking sensations that resembled one another. Id. at 260-61. Similarly, cau-
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Building on the skepticism of Hume, Georg Hegel made
some important criticisms of the Western self. In contrast to
the universal notions of reason proffered by Kant, Descartes,
and Locke, Hegel was the first philosopher of the modern period to suggest that reason and identity are not transcendental,
but instead need to be viewed in a historical context.3 9 Because
Hegel contextualized reason, one commentator has described
him as an "idealist" who "does not understand human character or identity to be some fixed, immutable 'reality,' but rather
conceives of human beings as actively producing their character and identity in history." 0 The implications of Hegel's criticism of the universality of reason are profound. Because reason was not only the essence of man, but also the primary tool
that enabled man to understand and order the experiential
world, the conclusion that reason is relative inherently undermines modern conceptions of the world as objectively ordered and knowable. In other words, the modern project of
"self-making" provided the analytical premise for its project of
"world-making." If we reject the self as possessive of universal
reason, then we must also reject those insights regarding the
larger world that reason supposedly allows.
II. VOICES OF DISSENT
The development of the ideology of individualism has very
negative consequences. As the modern essentialist conception
of individuals informed governmental and jurisprudential theory, there was a concurrent need to construct an ideology to
justify certain practices, such as slavery and colonialism, which
clearly violated norms emanating from an equal and essential
self. Yet the very manner in which modernists defined the self
justified those practices. By construing the essence of the human self as individual and autonomous, European thinkers
deliberately excluded from selfhood members of non-White so4
cieties that were organized around non-individualistic norms. '
sation created a sense of identity in subjects and objects by ordering sensations, and "[als memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of
this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd upon that account chiefly,
as the source of personal identity." Id. at 261.
39. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 31-34 (Robert S. Hartman trans., 1953).
40. LEWIS P. HINCHMAN, HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 33
(1984).
41. GOLDBERG, supra note 16, at 44; see also john a. powell, The "Racing"

of American Society: Race Functioningas a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun,
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Similarly, the adherence of modernists to Christian beliefs4 2
also justified the conquest and subjugation of non-Christian
(i.e., non-White) "infidels."4 3 Other complementary ideologies
have been employed as needed to provide scientific (e.g.,
eugenics' and polygenics45 ) and, more recently, cultural (e.g.,
the "culture of poverty"4 6) explanations for the inequalities of
Western society.
Given the exclusively defined "essence" of identity, it is not
surprising that criticisms of the Western self have arisen
mainly from the groups that Western society has marginalized.
Writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, W.E.B.
DuBois articulated his anguish as an African American trying
to attain a sense of self-unity in a society that defined him in
ways that contradicted his own sense of identity:
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world,-a world which yields him no
true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the
revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this doubleconsciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the
eyes of others,.... One ever feels his two-ness .... The history of
the American Negro is the history of this strife,-this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better
and truer self.47

DuBois's reflections suggest the postmodern, intersectional
self, the self of "others" fragmented by society's dominant discourse.4" Importantly, DuBois demonstrates that those people
15 LAW & INEQ. J. 99, 110 (1997) (noting that European exaltation of the individual was adopted in part to distinguish White Europeans from non-White
peoples organized around nonindividualistic norms).
42. In the epistemologies of modern philosophers, Christian conceptions
of God played a central role. See, e.g., RENE DESCARTES, Meditations, in I
PHILOsOPHICAL WORKS OF DESCARTES 197-99 (E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross
trans., 1967).
43. GOLDBERG, supra note 16, at 16.
44. Id. at 55-56.
45. Id. at 33-34.
46. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: "Hewinga Stone of Hope from a Mountain of Despair," 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1233, 1243-44 (1995) (noting characterizations of the inner city and the
culture of poverty); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-DiscriminationLaw,
101 HARV.L. REV. 1331, 1379 (1988) (stating that assumptions of cultural inferiority have replaced claims of racial inferiority).
47. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8-9 (1995).
48. As James Boyle notes, there is a tension in writings on the self between the role of structure (or context) in defining the self and the agency or
ability of the individual to self-define. James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible?
The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489, 492 (1991).
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whom society has marginalized and dehumanized do not experience the unitary self as an essence, but 4as9 an aspiration; a
"longing" for coherence and self-satisfaction.
Zora Neale Hurston's reflections on her sense of self also
question the idea of a unitary and static self. Hurston recounts
how her experience of possessing a racialized identity was not
an essential one, but rather was largely a product of her
placement within a societal framework:
I remember the very day that I became colored. Up to my thirteenth
year I lived in the little Negro town of Eatonville, Florida ....[Then]
I was sent to school in Jacksonville. I left Eatonville, the town of the
oleanders, as Zora. When I disembarked from the river-boat50at Jacksonville she was no more ....I was now a little colored girl

This reflection demonstrates that Hurston did not experience her self as unitary-she was both "Zora" and a nameless
"little colored girl."5 Nor was Hurston's sense of self static.
Experience created her identity, which changed as her context
changed. Concerning her sense of a racial identity, Hurston
wrote, "I feel most colored when I am thrown up against a
sharp white background."52
In this White context we can envision both DuBois and
Hurston grappling with the reconciliation of their own senses
of self with the foreign subhuman notion of self thrust upon
them. Frantz Fanon, writing about colonizer and colonized,
articulates this conundrum of identity that the modern self
creates for marginalized groups: "Because it is a systematic
negation of the other person and a furious determination to
deny the other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism
My belief is that both of these forces toll part of the story and that they are
not mutually exclusive, but instead mutually limiting.
49. As I will argue later in the Essay, this is an unattainable ideal. See
infra text accompanying note 144. The unitary self is an illusion that the
dominant White male is able to maintain because of his central situating in
modem discourse.
50. Zora Neale Hurston, How It Feels to be ColoredMe, in I LovE MYSELF
WHEN I AM LAUGHING 152-53 (Alice Walker ed., 1979).
51. Hurston's fiction also reflects this notion of a discordance between
self-perception and one's identity as construed by the dominant discourse. In
Their Eyes Were Watching God, Janie, the protagonist, at age six makes the
following remarks upon viewing a photograph of herself for the first time:
So when we looked at de picture and everybody got pointed out there
wasn't nobody left except a real dark little girl with long hair standing by Eleanor. Dat's where Ah was s'posed to be, but Ah couldn't
recognize dat dark chile as me. So Ah ast, "where is me? Ah don't see
me."
ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEm EYEs WERE WATCHING GOD 9 (1937).
52. Hurston, supra note 50, at 154.
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forces the people it dominates to ask themselves the question
constantly: 'In reality, who am I?'"
Hurston's metaphor of the white background also illustrates how it is that White males may not have a similar experience of fragmented identities. Against a white backgroundwithin a theoretical framework that defines them as coherent
and human-individual whites are free to choose the manner
in which they distinguish themselves. Confident that those
aspects they find most central to their identity are legitimate,
White males are free to cultivate their "arbitrary contingencies" with little fear of loss of humanity.54 There is no dissonance between Whites' personal experiences of humanity and
societal definitions of humanity. Thus, the smooth fit between
societal norms of Whiteness and the constructed identity of
Whites creates an illusion of coherence and racial invisibility
or neutrality-of "normality."55 By attaining this sense of racial neutrality, White males are thus able to adhere to notions
of the essentialized modern self without problematizing their
own sense of identity.
The false unity and transparency of Whiteness and maleness leave those who are not White males futilely seeking the
sense of unity they perceive in a White male self that is in reality neither unitary nor transparent. For example, like Dubois,
Fanon expresses the view that it is the experience of racial
subjugation that fractures the self of the colonized: "I am being
dissected under white eyes [that] objectively cut away slices of
my reality."56 Thus the pull to be an individual, especially by
Blacks and other "others," is an effort to claim one's humanity
by not being marked by race, gender, etc. It is an effort to become, or pass for, the White male. In a subtle way this error of
normalizing the unstated marker of the dominant discourse
shadows some of the language of intersectionality.
53. FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 250 (1963).
54. This is provided, of course, that they do not transgress other constructed borders such as those of gender and sexuality.
55. What this invisibility masks is the myriad ways in which Whiteness
has been defined and redefined in order to maintain the privileged status of
Whites. In fact, given the scientific unreality of race, one can argue that to be
White mostly means to be privileged. See generally powell, supra note 41, at
120-24 (discussing Whiteness as actually signifying privilege).
56. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 116 (Charles L. Markmann trans., 1967). Elsewhere Fanon writes, "As long as the black man is
among his own, he will have no occasion, except in minor internal conflicts, to
experience his being through others." Id. at 109.
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A. THE INTERSECTIONAL SELF

Contemporary feminist theorists have made a significant
contribution to the rejection of the modern unitary self by asserting that if such a separate and autonomous self exists, it is
certainly not the female self. 7 Instead, they propose an alternative description of the female self. Early attempts, by White
feminists in particular, at creating a separate theory of the self,
however, fell prey to the same essentialist problems inherent
in the modern self." As the critical race theorists noted, description of the male and the female could more accurately be
described as White male and female. By accepting the prevailing concept of the unitary, autonomous self as applied to White
males, and supplementing it with an essentialist female foil,
early White feminists replicated the exclusionary tendencies of
the modern self.5 9 These White feminists were aware of the
problem but misunderstood its nature. They assumed that to
really deal with sexism one should look at the experiences of
White women "unmodified" by race. 60 They failed to see that
White is as much of a racial modifier as Black. Thus, they assumed that Black women's experiences and ontological space
could be captured by adding the "race" and "gender" categories
together. As Angela Harris notes, this new framework "reduce[d] the lives of people who experience multiple forms of oppression to addition problems: 'racism + sexism = straight
black woman's experience,' or 'racism + sexism + homophobia =
61
black lesbian experience."'
Some White feminist theorists thought that the essential
female perspective was best articulated by White women whose

57. See generally MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN, MEN,
AND MORALS 482-83 (1985); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT 6-8 (1982); Robin West,
Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1988).

58. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 590-605 (1990) (critiquing Catharine MacKinnon's dominance theory and Robin West's "essential woman" theory).
59. Put another way, early feminists offered a very modem conception of
the female self by acceding to Western society's demand for total, not partial,
explanations. Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs:Science, Technology,
and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s, in FEMINISMPOSTMODERNISM 190, 202
(Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990).
60. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIsCOURSE ON LIFE AND LAW 16 (1987) (arguing that feminism must be
"unqualified by pre-existing modifiers").
61. Harris, supra note 58, at 588.
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experiences as women were somehow equivalent to the Black
female experience distilled of race. To extend the mathematical metaphor, in White women, these early feminists felt that
they could "isolate" the variable of sexism from the variable of
racism, and so better understand it. Similarly, the paradigmatic racial experience became that of the minority male,
whose experiences of racism were isolated from sexism. 62 Using this theoretical framework it was possible to construct the
experience of minority women without even considering them.
Hence, this conceptualization of the female self functioned to
rather than include, all but the "typical" White feexclude,
63
male.
In reaction to this flawed analysis, several minority feminist thinkers proposed the theory of the intersectional self.
The basic tenet of intersectionality is that "women of color
stand at the intersection of the categories of race and gender,
and that their experiences are not simply that of racial oppression plus gender oppression."' These systems of oppression combine in symbiotic ways to create unique experiences.
Furthermore, because all categories exist in relation to other
categories (i.e., "Black" exists in relation to "White"), the intersectional self is descriptive of all individuals, not only those
victimized by multiple systems of oppression." Thus, intersectionality subverts the notion of the modern self. Instead, it
states that "we are not born with a 'self,' but rather are composed of a welter of partial, sometimes contradictory, or even
antithetical 'selves.' "66 The significance of each of these fragmented "selves" for one's sense of identity shifts as a result of
both external and internal stimulus and experience.6 7 Thus

62. An anthology on Black women's studies makes this phenomenon explicit in its title: ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHrTE, ALL THE BLAcKS ARE MEN, BuT
SOME OF Us ARE BRAvE (Gloria Hull et al. eds., 1982)).
63. As will be discussed in greater detail later, this essentialized conception of discrimination also informed the manner in which the law addressed
racism and sexism. See infra Part IV.
64. Grillo, supra note 8, at 18. Kimberl6 Crenshaw provides a very explicit account of how the minority woman's experience of intersectionality creates unique difficulties and contradictions in the legal and political spheres.
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:Intersectionality,Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color,43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1993).
65. Harris, supra note 9, at 210.
66. Harris, supra note 58, at 584.
67. Grillo, supra note 8, at 17.
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the importance of race for Zora Neale Hurston's own sense of
identity depended on her environment. 8
B. OTHER POSTMODERN REFLECTIONS ON THE SELF

Many postmodern and late modern theories of the self echo
the assertions of the intersectionality critique, and assert that
the self is fractured and multiple. For example, Katherine
Ewing describes how some anthropologists have undergone a
similar shift away from an essentialist or unitary self. She
writes that anthropologists have typically viewed the self
through a unitary Eurocentric lens as "a symbol or cluster of
symbols that they identify in their writing as a culture's characteristic concept of self or person which they contrast with the
Western concept of self."69 In contrast, Ewing notes, several
"[r]ecent studies by anthropologists of the 'self are grounded in
a relativist paradigm which, if not altogether denying the existence of universals in human experience, is intended to demonstrate that there is much less that is universal than we might
have supposed." 0
Ewing posits that "in all cultures people can be observed
to project multiple, inconsistent self-representations that are
context-dependent and may shift rapidly." According to Ewing, it is these individual self-representations that create the
illusory sense of wholeness that people perceive. She states
that "[p]eople construct a series of self-representations that are
based on selected cultural concepts of persons and selected
'chains' of personal memories. Each self-concept is experienced
as whole and continuous, with its own history and memories
that emerge in a specific context." 2 Furthermore, challenges to
the individual's sense of wholeness are a challenge to our
"integrative capacities," 3 testing our ability to preserve the illusion of wholeness through synthesis and integration.7 4 Applying this framework to the experiences of marginalized
groups, the fragmentation felt by "others" arguably results

68. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (noting Hurston's sense
of racial identity).
69. Ewing, supra note 9, at 251.
70. Id. at 255.
71. Id. at 251.
72. Id. at 253.
73. Id. at 270.
74. Id. at 270-71.
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from the difficult task of integrating the dominant discourse to
individual experience.
Other postmodernists have also expressed similar views on
the self. For instance, consistent with intersectionality's assertion "that 'identity itself has little substance,""5 Donna
Haraway "skips the step of original unity" 76 and states that
"there is nothing about being 'female' that naturally binds
women."77 Gender is constructed and is thus an "artificial" determinant of identity. Postmodernists also tend to agree with
the notion of the self as relational and fluid-dependent upon
the context in which it exists. Susan Stanford Friedman offers
an analysis of the self akin to the intersectional critique. She
calls it the "script of relational positionality"78 and defines it as:
"[a] feminist analysis of identity as it is constituted at the crossroads of different systems of stratification ... acknowledging
how privilege and oppression are often not absolute categories
but, rather, shift in relation to different axes of power and
powerlessness." 79 Given the shifting crossroads each individual experiences, Friedman maintains that the self is constructed by a "multiplicity
of fluid identities defined and acting
8
situationally." 1
C. THE MULTI-RACIAL SELF
One insight of postmodernism that has very valuable implications for how we confront oppression is the notion of the
self defined in relation to its context and its relation to other
selves. Postmodernists advance a "new concept of identity, one
which is never fixed or determined, but is forever shifting because it is generated by the individual's perception of the difference between himself or herself and others within a particular system.""' Given this fluidity and relationality, one's own
sense of identity is inextricably entwined with, and dependent
upon, the identity of "others." This recognition has led to a new
82
way of understanding racial identity: the multi-racial self.
75. Harris, supra note 9, at 211.
76. Haraway, supra note 59, at 192.

77. Id. at 196-97.
78. Susan Stanford Friedman, Beyond White and Other:Relationalityand
Narrativesof Race in Feminist Discourse,in SIGNS 1, 7 (1995).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 17.
81. Dunning, supra note 17, at 133.
82. This concept equally applies to gender, sexual orientation, and other
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The power of this modern discourse has had fundamental
ramifications for the construction of selves. Crenshaw describes how "racist ideology" arranges "oppositional categories
in a hierarchical order; historically, whites represent[] the
dominant antimony while Blacks came to be seen as separate
and subordinate.... [E]ach traditional negative image of
Blacks correlates with a counter-image of whites.""3 Harris
notes that for "othered" groups the "experience of multiplicity
is also a sense of self-contradiction, of containing the oppressor
within oneself."84 James Baldwin takes this insight a step further and asserts that the experience of the White male is
similarly contradictory, if not similarly problematic: the White
male self contains the oppressed within it.85 Ruth Frankenberg similarly states that "White/European self-constitution
is ... fundamentally tied to the process of the discursive production of others, rather than preexisting that process."8 6
In addition to its effects upon self-perception, the multiracial self also has vast implications for how we understand
racism and how the law should analyze and address it. Toni
Morrison, in Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary
Imagination,88 explores the ways in which the construction and
invocation of the "Africanist" identity in White American literature has been central to the development of an American
ethos. Morrison chronicles how the creation of the "New
World" depended on Americans overcoming the ills of the "Old
World." She observes that "[t]he desire for freedom is preceded
by oppression; a yearning for God's law is born of the detestation of human license and corruption; the glamour of riches is
in thrall to poverty, hunger, and debt." 89 Morrison contends
matrices of oppression. Haraway recognizes this when she refers to the
"noninnocence of the category woman." Haraway, supra note 59, at 199. Amy
Mullin makes a similar insight when she states: "Given that ours is still a
racist, sexist, and homophobic society, it is easy to predict that self-mastery
will become associated with mastery over people who are not white, as well as
other women and homosexuals." Amy Mullin, Selves, Diverse and Divided:
Can FeministsHave Diversity Without Multiplicity?, 10 HYPATIA 1, 7-8 (1995).

83. Crenshaw, supra note 46, at 1373.
84. Harris, supra note 58, at 608.
85.

BALDWIN, supra note 1, at 690.

86. Ruth Frankenberg, Whiteness and Americanness: Examining Constructions of Race, Culture, and Nation in White Women's Life Narratives,in
RACE 62, 63 (Steven Gregory & Roger Sanjek eds., 1994).
87.

See infra Part IV.

88. MORRISON, supra note 5, at 34-38.
89. Id. at 34-35.
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that European Americans constructed the racialized and polarized identity of Blacks as concrete proof of their transcending
this oppression, corruption, and destitution, for "[n]othing
highlighted freedom-if it did not in fact create it-like slavery."90 For White American writers, this oppositional identity
became a convenient and vital literary device: "[T]hrough the
way writers peopled their work with the signs and bodies of
this presence-one can see that a real or fabricated Africanist
presence was crucial to their sense of Americanness," 91 -that
is, their sense of Whiteness.
IH. THE LEAP TO ANTIESSENTIALISM
Despite the postmodern consensus that the self is multiple
and relational rather than unitary and static, theorists have
not paid enough attention to the internal functions of the multiple self-that is, to the issues of to what extent, and for what
reason, the multiple parts are integrated or separated within
the self. For example, structuralists tend to primatize the role
of language and context in the structure of the self.92 As James
Boyle demonstrates, however, this view is problematic in the
way that it minimizes the role of individual choice and agency
in individual development. He notes that "It]he structuralist
critiques portray the epistemology of subject and object as a
real fantasy, that is to say, something which is already out
there, which we need only to criticize. By doing so they ignore
or minimize the act of choice . . . ."' This de-emphasis of
agency is an understandable consequence of the rejection of the
essentially autonomous and rational self. It manifests itself in
an absence of discussion about why the self organizes experience in the manner that it does. For example, although Ewing
explains in great detail the shifting, multiple functions of the
individual, she does little to explore the internal impetus for
these functions. Ewing asserts that "[t]hese selves are highly
context-dependent and mutually inconsistent. There is no

90. Id. at 38.
91. Id. at 6.
92. See generally DALLYMAYR, TWILIGHT OF SUBJECTIVITY (1981) (discussing the role of language and context in the development of the sell); FOUcAULT,
supra note 3. Haraway, who identifies herself as materialist, places a similar
primacy on the role of language and information systems and claims that the
key to displacing the modem project "rests on a theory of language and controls." Haraway, supra note 59, at 206.
93. Boyle, supra note 48, at 500.
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overarching, cohesive self that is identifiable to an outside observer."9 4 She offers little, however, that might explain what it
is about the self that leads to the construction of these multiple
identities. Ewing also fails to address the tensions among differing self-conceptions, instead asserting that each distinct
self-conception has its own set of memories that give it a sense
of wholeness.95 Although such fluidity of the self may at times
be effortless and smooth, the painful experiences of multiplicity
and self-contradiction typifying the narratives of subordinated
groups make clear that this is not always the case. There is a
direct interaction among the multiplicitous aspects of the self,
and failing to recognize this interaction threatens a return to
the essentialist "math problem" discussed earlier. 6
If we are to benefit from postmodern criticisms of the modern self, we must address the difficult questions relating to
agency, and the seemingly integrated nature of the multiple
self. It is also important to consider other conceptions of the
self that retain some degree of essentialism. Amy Mullin cautions that "we need to speak with more clarity when we refer to
selves as unified or divided.... [I]t is important to avoid assuming that effectively unified selves must be homogenous or
97
integrated to the point that harmony is rarely threatened."
She criticizes the leap from a unitary to an entirely multiple
and nonessential self98 as overly quick and flawed by the modernist need for certainty that postmodernism purports to reject. According to Mullin:
[Tihe understanding of the person as a composite of personlike parts
expresses a conception of the person as ideally a harmonious integrated whole, a conception so powerful that, when the unity is not
found at the level of the person as a whole, it is postulated of the
"parts" of the person[, each] associated with a community that is seen
as itself harmonious and unfissured. Hence while the impact of social relations on the formation and the personality of the self is acknowledged, it is also simplified and fixed once and for all."

Mullin advocates that, rather than presume that the self is either unitary or multiple, we instead develop "new ways of un94. Ewing, supra note 9, at 259 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 268.
96. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Harris's
mathematical formula).
97. Mullin, supra note 82, at 1-2.
98. Mullin describes the multiple self as the theory that the self is
"composed of relatively fixed or agent-like aspects or parts." Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 8.
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derstanding the unity of the empirical subject as a matter of
the degree, pattern, and effectiveness of its organization."'00 A
necessary corollary of this is that we "at least attempt to understand what shape[s] 0 and
continues to shape our prefer11
ences, fears and values."
Mullin cautions us not to be overzealous in our move away
from the modern self. Recognizing that the self is multiplicitous does not require the conclusion that there is no essence to
the self. Given the ramifications of reconceptualizing the self,
we must consider whether there is some viable alternative to
the modernist conception of the self that does not rest upon social construction. Although this endeavor may ultimately
prove fruitless, it is a valuable one nevertheless. To this end, I
briefly offer two conceptions of the self that recognizes its multiplicitous and constructed nature, while leaving room for an
essentialist understanding of at least part of the process of
consciousness: psychoanalysis and Buddhism.
A. THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SELF
Although people generally accept the notion that there are
unconscious processes that affect our functionings, very few
have used this insight to enhance understanding of the self
and identity. Perhaps this can be explained by postmodernists'
distrust of theories that attempt to provide universal explanations for the self. Ewing expresses this sentiment in her
statement that "a single model of self or person is not adequate
for describing how selves are experienced or represented in any
culture."0 2 Nevertheless, she recognizes that the psychoanalytic (or 'Freudian") self, though essential in some respects,
has descriptive capabilities that are not necessarily inconsistent with the notion of a multiple and relational self. She
claims that "[tihe phenomenon to which the psychoanalysts are
alluding when they speak of a cohesive self-that is, the experience of wholeness that derives from a symbolic constitution of
the self and the phenomenon of rapid shifts in the content of
that experience-may be universal."'
Given that psycho100. Id. at 20.
101. Id. at 17.
102. Ewing, supra note 9, at 257.
103. Id. at 274. Others have not been so accepting of psychoanalysis. For
example, Jane Flax criticizes Freudian theory on the ground that it "assumes
that individual humans all share an essence with a common developmental
pattern and that this pattern is or should be rational, sequential, purposive
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analysis offers some insight into the notion of a multiple and
relational self, the theory should be considered.
Psychoanalysis focuses on "the individual in his capacity to
generate a sense of 'I-ness' (subjectivity)."' °4 According to
Freud, this sense of unity is a function of the two basic facets of
The conscious
the mind, the conscious and the unconscious.'
mind is generally logical and consists of those mental processes
which we are aware of, while the unconscious mind consists of
processes that escape our awareness but nevertheless shape
identity and actions. The unconscious mind tackles the "desires,
wishes, and instincts that strive for gratification."" 6 Thus,
Freud relocates the self from the conscious mind, where modernism places it, to somewhere in the interactions between the
conscious and unconscious. 107 Because it consists of the interplay between the conscious and unconscious, the Freudian self
is "fundamentally dialectic in nature." °8
According to Thomas Ogden, this interplay of the conscious
0 9
and unconscious is a "[d]ialectic of [piresence and [a]bsence."
In this interaction, what is present in conscious experience "is
continually negated by that which it is not, while all the time
alluding to what is lacking in itself.""0 What is absent from
the conscious mind's experience is often present in the unconscious mind, and the Freudian mind uses this dialectic to
maintain a sense of wholeness and placidity. When there is
tension between the (context-dependent) values of the conscious mind and incongruous thoughts or desires, the subject
employs "[d]efensive mechanisms such as repression, denial,
and additive." Jane Flax, Multiple: On the Contemporary Politicsof Subjectivity, 16 HUMAN STUDIES 33, 38 (1993). Flax goes on to assert that "[n]aturalizing
and universalizing this developmental history obscures its fictive qualities and
prescriptive purposes." Id.
104.

THOMAS H. OGDEN, SUBJECTS OF ANALYSIS 14 (1994).

105. Others have embellished upon Freud's theories of internal functionings to posit much more radically situated selves. For example, Carl Jung
maintained that the self was composed of a multitude of daimons, archetypal
historical figures of varying genders, races, and even species that all functioned to constitute the individual self. JAMES HILLMON, HEALING FIcTION
53-70 (1983).
106. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331 (1987).
107. OGDEN, supra note 104, at 18 ("The subject for Freud is to be sought
in the phenomenology corresponding to that which lies in the relations between the consciousness and unconsciousness.").
108. Id. at 7.
109. Id. at 20.
110. Id. at 21.
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introjection, projection, reaction formation, sublimation, and
reversal [which] resolve the conflicts between the primary and
secondary processes 1by disguising forbidden wishes and making them palatable." '
This dialectical process also has an intersubjective aspect:
how we define ourselves and how we define others are interdependent functions of our interactions with others.112 Psychoanalyst Melanie Klein asserts that the self is actually "decentered
from its exclusive locus within the individual; instead the subject is conceived of as arising in a dialectic (a dialogue) of self
and Other." Through the process of "projective identification,"
the subject is able to resolve internal conflicts by projecting
those aspects of the conflict considered negative onto others:
Projective identification... is not simply an unconscious phantasy of
projecting an aspect of oneself into the Other and controlling him
from within; it represents a psychological-interpersonal event in
which the projector, through actual interpersonal interaction with
the recipient of the projective identification, exerts pressure on the
Other to experience himself and behave in congruence with the omnipotent projective phantasy.' 3

Thus, the psychoanalytic subject is contextual and relational in
at least two key respects: (1) the formation of the conscious self
and its ethos, and (2) the stability of the subject as internal
conflicts are resolved through the defensive mechanism of projection.
The Freudian account of the self is in many respects consistent with postmodernism's assertion that the self is relational and contextual. The conscious self is largely defined by
social interactions. Consequently, it experiences incoherency
and multiplicity as individuals in any sociohistorical context
do. To this extent, psychoanalysis does not assert an a priori
self in the manner that modernity does. Furthermore, the
dialectical self of psychoanalysis offers an explanation of how
the subject seeks to construct wholeness or unity out of multiplicity and how "others" play an integral role in this process.
111. Lawrence, supra note 106, at 331-32.
112. See OGDEN, supra note 104, at 63 (noting Ogden's conception of analytic intersubjectivity, which places central emphasis on its dialectical nature). Ogden uses the examples of infant and mother, and analyst and analysand, asserting that in these dialectical pairs the existence of one is
dependent upon the existence of the other. Id. Psychoanalyst Melanie Klein
asserts that the self is actually "decentered from its exclusive locus within the
individual; instead the subject is conceived of as arising in a dialectic (a dialogue) of self and Other." Id. at 47.
113. Id. at 44.
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Yet Freudian theorists believe that these processes of the
mind, the interplay of the unconscious1 4and conscious involving
drives and instinct, exist in everyone.
The Freudian theory of self provides valuable insight into
the way that racism and other systems of oppression function
in our society. The dialectic of consciousness and unconsciousness helps us to understand the persistence and pervasiveness
of "unintentional" racism in our society despite the general
disavowal of explicitly racist ideologies. In a society such as
ours where racialized meanings are unavoidably pervasive, the
ostensibly antiracist individual is consistently confronted with
conflicts between its nonracist ethos and internalized racist
attitudes. In order to resolve this conflict, the individual resorts to the aforementioned "defensive mechanisms":
[T]he human mind defends itself against the discomfort of guilt by
denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes, and beliefs that
conflict with what the individual has learned is good or right....
When an individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and the
societal ethic that condemns
those ideas, the mind excludes his ra5
cism from consciousness.1

This helps to explain the pervasiveness of actions that contain
racist meanings but are not driven by the actor's conscious
116
"intent" to behave in a racist manner.
Psychoanalysis may also provide useful insight into the
multi-racial self discussed earlier." 7 Through the process of
projective identification, the subject is able to maintain a sense
of self consistent with its value system by projecting those
traits considered undesirable onto the Other. Charles Lawrence notes how the two prominent racially stereotyped narratives, that of the instinctive Other who is lazy, overly sexual,
114 Some have situated Freud between the romantic and the rationalist,
or between the modern and the postmodern. ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE
PROTEAN SELF: HUMAN RESILIENCE IN AN AGE OF FRAGMENTATION 24 (1993).
115. Lawrence, supra note 106, at 322-23.
116. Lawrence illustrates this point by referring to the controversy created
when sportscaster Howard Cosell referred to a Black football player as a
"monkey." See id. at 339-40 (discussing the Cosell comment as an example of
unconscious racism in everyday life). Accepting that .Cosell was not racist in
any willful respect and that he certainly could only be harmed by engaging in
deliberately racist behavior, Lawrence notes the unmistakably racist undertones in Cosell's choice of metaphor. See id. at 340 (arguing that Cosell's
"inadvertent slip of the tongue was not random ....[but] evidence of the continuing presence of a derogatory racial stereotype that he [had] repressed
from consciousness and that [had] momentarily slipped past his Ego's censors").
117. See supra Part I1.C (introducing the concept of the multi-racial self).
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and out of control (e.g., Blacks), and the Other who is conniving, overly-ambitious and materialistic (e.g., Jews), correspond
to two of the most common types of internal conflict: "that
which arises when an individual cannot master his instinctive
drives in a way that fits into rational and socially approved
patterns of behavior, and that which arises when an individual
cannot live up to the aspirations and standards of his own conscience."'
Because this psychoanalytic process involves the subject
actively pressuring the Other to behave in a manner consistent
with the projected trait,"9 the success of projection in resolving
an individual's conflict depends on his or her ability to control
the Other. As our history of racism makes explicit, control is a
key element of the racial project. In some respects then, the
psychoanalytic account of the self is a useful and instructive
alternative to the modern-postmodern debate about the self. If
correct, psychoanalysis has fundamental implications for our
current jurisprudence.' 20

B. THE BUDDHIST SELF
Buddhism also offers a theory of subjectivity that is both
essentialist and nonessentialist. A number of writers have
suggested that postmodernism derives from and depends on
modernism and that the very attempt to disprove modernism is
based on modernist assumptions. 12' This suggests that both
modernism and postmodernism are conceptually and culturally
related; they reflect a common, specific cultural and historical
perspective. This insight also suggests that there may be ways
of thinking and talking about issues of the self that,-do not fit
within either the modernist or the postmodernist structure. If
those two structures do not exhaust the possibilities, Buddhism may be an alternative structure. Anne Carolyn Klein
makes clear that the current focus in the West upon the con-

118. Lawrence, supra note 106, at 333-34. This framework of analysis also
provides insight into Toni Morrison's account of the role of Blacks in American
literature and her assertion that slavery was a possibly indispensable corollary to the freedom of White Americans. See MORRISON, supra note 5, at 38.
119. Lawrence, supra note 106, at 333-34.
120. See infra Part IV.
12L See generally BENHABIB, supra note 30, at 2 (addressing "what is living and what is dead in universalist moral and political theories of the present, after their criticism in the hands of communitarians, feminists, and
postmodernists"); BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 18-20.
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structed nature of the self is in part caused by the failure to
take seriously the interdependent nature of things that has
always informed Buddhism:
From a Buddhist perspective, the contemporary fascination with the
incoherent and incapturable multiplicities that construct self and
knowledge suggests an intellectual history that never took sufficient
note of the interdependent, constructed, and impermanent nature of
things in the first place. Recognition of constructedness does not, for
Buddhists, devalorize the unconstructed. 22

The conditional and the unconditional, the essential and the
unessential, are not contradictory for Buddhism but are always
present together.
One of the central tenets of Buddhism is that there is no
permanent self.'23 Rather, Buddhists assert that the self and
all phenomena are constructed and lack permanent inherent
existence. This lack of inherent existence is also described as
emptiness. Indeed, the emptiness of inherent existence means
that the self and all phenomena are constructed and conditional-that is, put together and unessential. This emptiness
of inherent existence is often referred to as the unconditional.
But emptiness is not the opposite of, or separate from, phenomena; indeed, phenomena are both unconditioned and conditioned. As Klein notes, the unconditional and conditional coexist and are compatible in Buddhist theory:
Middle Way Buddhist philosophy emphasizes what I call ontological
nondualism, meaning that emptiness and dependent arisings are indivisible. In other words, the play of differences, the process of conditioning, is an insufficient description of how things are. Moreover,
the conditioned and unconditioned can be experienced simultaneously
because conditioned
things and unconditioned emptiness are intrinsi24
cally compatible.

The self and all phenomena are put together, compounded, and
conditional. While this process of constitution or construction
occurs very rapidly, there are gaps nonetheless. In this sense,
Buddhism supports structuralist, postmodern claims regarding
the self by asserting that self-consciousness is largely put together by language. 125 This assertion of the nonessential self is
more persuasive coming from Buddhism, because it is based on
122. ANNE CAROLYN KLEIN, MEETING THE GREAT BLISS QUEEN: BUDDHISTS, FEMINISTS AND THE ART OF THE SELF 140 (1995).

123. Id. at 127.
124. Id. at 136.
125. While Buddhists agree that self-consciousness is largely put together
by language, they also believe that the process of self-consciousness starts at
a pre-language level. Id. at 11.
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a wholly separate tradition, rather than the reactive refutation
of modernism.
Hume and others of the postmodern tradition have been
compared to Buddhists,'126 but these comparisons often miss a
critical difference. Buddhists' understanding of the nature of
the self does not end at the level of social construction and
mental artifices. As mentioned earlier, Buddhists believe that
there is the unconditioned emptiness that is not put together
or constituted. This uncondition is not a concept or a thing.
Emptiness is also empty of inherent condition. Emptiness
cannot be grasped directly by the language narrative because it
is not part of the conceptual world. This does not mean that
emptiness is beyond consciousness, but only that it is beyond
conceptual consciousness. Emptiness can, however, be experienced directly through the practice of" 'mindfulness,' which is
the ability to sustain a calm, intense, and steady focus when
one intends to do so." 127 Mindfulness involves accessing a state
of consciousness that is beyond and ungoverned by experience
and context. Thus, much of the Buddhist practice of sitting is
directed towards gaining access to the place that is empty of
concepts. One may ask whether this place, if we can even call
it a place, is essential or unessential. The problem inherent in
this question is that as soon as we ask it we are back in the
realm of conceptual duality and not in the "unpatterned" space
that is free of concepts. 128 Buddhists agree with postmod-

126. For example, neo-Buddhist Serge-Christophe Kolm describes the construction of the self in terms strikingly similar to those of Hume's referenced
earlier:
One begins by acknowledging that a person is composed of several
elements. The profane person would see this as a "decomposition" of
the still perceptible person into several elements. One would then
make him see that what he believed to be a person is only this set of
elements that he stubbornly persisted in regarding as a whole ....
Serge-Christophe Kolm, The Buddhist Theory of "No-self," in THE MULTIPLE
SELF 233, 255 (Jon Elster ed., 1985).
127. KLEIN, supra note 122, at 11.
128. It may be that the essentialism debate is analogous to the scientific
debate over whether light is a wave or a particle. The possibilities that something is constructed either of particles or waves were considered mutually exclusive. So the question arises, is light made up of particles or is light made
up of waves? It turns out that if the experiment designed to answer this
question is set up to measure waves, then light is found to be a wave. Conversely, if the experiment is designed to measure particles, then light is found
to be made up of particles. JEREMY M. HAYWARD, SHI'rNG WORLDS,
CHANGING MINDS: WHERE THE SCIENCES AND BUDDHISM MEET 18 (1987).
Thus, the parameters of the question "What is light?" are found to be inconsis-
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ernists that the world of language and concepts is constructed
and unessential. Buddhists believe there is a consciousness
that goes beyond concepts:
It is the claim of Buddhists that through the practice of meditation,
the entire perceptual process can be brought into awareness, including the moment of the first split between "self" and world. The
awareness that perceives this process, and the ground within which
it arises, is not dependent on language and is not oriented toward a
self; therefore it is known as "nonreferential awareness." 2 9

In asserting that there is an existence before and beyond concepts, Buddhism asserts that the individual, as distinguished
from the individual's identity or self, "cannot be reduced to a
'site of competing discourses,' as it often is in feminist and
other postmodern descriptions." 3 0
I must emphasize that my goal is not to resolve this question of essentialism and antiessentialism. I want instead to
show how the question itself and the apparent answers are often products of a limited cultural discourse even when the aim
is to critique the limits of the cultural discourse itself. Thus
postmodernism may be an internal criticism of modernism because it adopts certain fundamental premises of the modern
paradigm. My claim, then, is a modest one: there are strong
reasons to believe that the self is not unitary, transparent, and
stable in the way posited by early modernists. Further, there
are many things that we believe in, including the unconscious,
that strongly suggest that the self is at least fractured if not
multiple. Accepting the self as fractured and/or multiple, however, does not compel a categorical adoption of the postmodern
position.
Although I am not advocating an explicit acceptance of
Buddhism, it is important to note that Buddhism has positive
implications for personal and interpersonal interaction. Because Buddhism accepts the self as multiple and at times conflicting or contradictory, it "departs from the urge to master,

tent with the true nature of light. Light is composed of both waves and particles. Similarly, Buddhism asserts that the parameters of the essentialist]
nonessentialist debate are flawed in that both "antinomes" are in part correct.
Moreover, how we ask and verify the question does not just affect the answer
we arrive at, but reality itself. Our questions and methods of observing the
world participate in the world we are observing. Thus, the answer to the
question, "Is there anything in the world essential or is everything unessential?" may be that it depends.
129. Id. at 132.
130. KLEIN, supra note 122, at 81.
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override, rein in, or otherwise manipulate the self."'31 Thus, it
does not seek to construct a unitary, coherent sense of self. As
Klein notes, this practice "of being nonjudgmental toward oneself has special significance in a culture where self-hatred is an
issue."13 2 By being nonjudgmental, Buddhism also moves beyond the psychic tension that psychoanalysis believes is the
source of projecting negative traits onto the "other." "When all
the voices of the self are fully owned, they are less likely to be
projected onto others. In this way, self-acceptance translates
into acceptance of the other."133 Thus, Buddhism requires, in
establishing relations with oneself, that the mindful person
"[have] models of self-engagement that do not denigrate or otherwise oppress.1 3 4
IV. RECONSTITUTING THE LEGAL SUBJECT
AND THE LAW
By rejecting the modern self, postmodernism strikes at the
very foundation of modern jurisprudence, the legal subject.
Consistent with modernism and social contract theory, the law
is largely premised upon the notion of an a priori self whose
"neutral" rights have priority over societal good. This self,
however, is clearly a fallacy. In their criticism of Rawls's jurisprudential theory, Sandel and Boyle make clear that a transparent, nonparticularized legal subject is an impossibility.
Rawls premises his supposedly neutral theory of justice on
the notion that there is an essence to humans that justice can
serve by promulgating "principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good." 13 5 Consequently, he asserts that these principles should be discovered
by placing oneself behind a theoretical "veil of ignorance" that
blinds the individual to the "outcome[s] of natural chance [and]
the contingency of social circumstances." 36 However, postmodernism makes clear that what modernism posits as the essence
of the self-that is, what aspects of identity Rawls and other
modern thinkers would take behind the veil of ignorance with
131. Id. at 80.
132. Id. This insight applies with equal force to minorities and others
whose senses of self are problematized by popular discourses.
133. Id. at 81.
134. Id. at 80.
135. SANDEL, supra note 30, at 1. See generally notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing Rawls's theories).
136. RAWLS, supra note 29, at 12.
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them-is in fact based upon a specific concept of the good. The
methodology, though purportedly neutral, incorporates a particular account of selfhood and masquerades it as a universal
concept. As Boyle remarks:
To accomplish all of this, Rawls must take a number of things away
from his subjects. He says that he wants subjects that are motivated
neither by altruism nor envy .... Self-interest, after all, is seen as
rational .... What if the stripped-down subjects were designed by
Kropotkin and Confucius... ?137

This juxtaposition of Rawls's conception of the self with others
who have clearly contradicting conceptions makes clear that
the process of determining what is essential to the universal
self is far from neutral. By accepting and dismissing various
aspects of the self as relevant or irrelevant, lawmakers inevitably give primacy to their own sense of self and, in so doing,
divorce various other aspects of selfhood that many people perceive as vital. Grillo makes this point in the context of a
woman of color:
[U]nder a traditional legal approach, when her situation is analyzed
as a woman, it is not analyzed as a Latina .... Her characteristics
are not connected one to the other; instead, they exist separately,
suspended in time and space. This fragmenting of identity by legal
analysis ... [is] entirely at odds with the concrete life of this

woman ....

138

Sandel exposes the non-neutrality of modern jurisprudence
another way when he critiques Rawls's reliance on social contract theory. Although Rawls creates a social contract that he
believes is neutral and fair, Sandel notes that the mere query
into fairness takes the contract out of the realm of neutrality:
As the non-trivial coherence of the "further question" attests ("But is
it fair, what they have agreed to?"), actual contracts are not selfsufficient moral instruments but presuppose a background morality
in the light of which the obligations arising from them may be quali39
fied and assessed.

The question of fairness requires that we fall back upon some
substantive understanding about what is just. In doing so, we
necessarily rely on our own sense of self and what is good for it.
Crenshaw makes a similar insight into the futility of searching
for a universal jurisprudence: "To give rights meaning, people
137. Boyle, supra note 48, at 507. Flax also posits that "[t]his metanarrative requires a certain form of subject-an undetermined one, who can be the
discoverer of truth. It requires a particular view of reality-rational, orderly
and accessible to and through our thought." Flax, supra note 103, at 35.
138. Grillo, supra note 8, at 17.
139. SANDEL, supra note 30, at 109.
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must specify the world; they must create a picture
of 'what is'
140
that grounds their normative interpretation."
Although the implications of rejecting the current legal
subject cut deep and wide, it is impossible to predict their vast
ramifications. What is needed is a sustained project that unmasks the power and coercion of the law and removes the cloak
of invisibility that we call neutrality. This project must discover and make explicit the ways in which "the law is actually
constitutive of our social existence."'4 1 It will require a sustained community effort. I only attempt to sketch out some of
the implications related to the intersectional thesis and the
treatment of racism in law.

A. THE INTERSECTIONAL THESIS RECONSIDERED
The theory of the intersectional self presumes that identity
is marked by many intersecting traits and that the implication
of this cannot be understood by simply adding these traits together."
For example, an African American female's experience is not adequately captured by adding the traits of a
(White) female with that of a Black (male). Thus, in terms of
the law, rules that prohibit racial and gender discrimination by
addressing them as discrete phenomena do not adequately extend protection to a person marked by both subordinate gender
and racial status. 43
But the intersectionality thesis can be understood to describe not just the sites of discrimination, but also the ontology
of the self at these intersections. That is, the intersectional self
can be construed as multiple because it is defined by the intersections of oppression. One of the possible implications of this
notion of intersectionality is that a self not marked by systems
of oppression (i.e., White, male, heterosexual, etc.) is not necessarily multiple. This conclusion, however, is a serious conceptual error that postmodernism and feminism have rejected, if

140. Crenshaw, supra note 46, at 1353.
141. Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the
Pactof the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (1984).
142. See supra Part II.A (explaining the theory of the intersectional self).
143. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 treats sources of
discrimination as theoretically distinct by declaring: "lilt shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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somewhat ambivalently. 44 Such an understanding of the intersectional self also leaves the "longing for coherence," seen in
the experiences of oppressed groups, uncritically situated in
the dominant and dominating narrative. It fails to consider
the full implications of the assertion that the self is relational.
It ignores that the dominant and the dominated are dialectically interdependent categories. The longing for coherence
sought by many marginalized people, especially those marked
by multiple oppressions, can be understood as a desire to pass,
to attain the status of the dominant self. On some level this
longing accepts the liberal notion that all categories, except
that of the individual, are artificial and do not fully embrace
the postmodern position that all categories, including that of
the individual, are socially constructed.
If race and gender always mark the self, then the White
male is also marked. He is no more a unitary, cohesive individual than is the Black female. Nevertheless, there is a lack
of symmetry between the White male and the Black female.
We can help to expose this by focusing on the marks of privilege and not solely on the marks of oppression. Marks of
privilege will vary at different sites, times, and cultures. Once
we develop a list, we can consider what should be added or
modified at a given site. A preliminary list might start with
male, White, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, and middle
class. This list can be augmented. If an individual possesses
all the possible markings of privilege at a site, that person
holds the maximum privilege available. The advantage to this
method of analysis is that it marks the unmarked and helps to
expose the interdependency of privilege and oppression. It also
makes it clear that all selves are at least partially constituted
and multiple.
But a problem remains in thinking about intersectionality
in this way. The approach I have just suggested implies that
each of the marking categories are unitary-it implies that
while gender and race may create an intersection, gender and
race are unitary concepts. This is clearly wrong. Just as categories intersect to create a composite, each category itself is a
composite.
When we look at Whiteness, for example, we see that
Whiteness is made up of what it excludes, particularly Blackness. The excluded other does not just function externally-as
144. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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in the exclusion from a particular neighborhood-it also functions internally. The self is fractured by the part of the selfWhiteness-that must deny the part of the self that is equally
present, yet loathed-Blackness. In a non-mutual way, Blackness necessarily carries Whiteness with it, externally and internally.1 4 It is not enough to look at how categories intersect
to create a sense of self. We must also examine how the categories themselves are created and maintained. 146 There may
be times and places where it is pragmatically important to talk
about these categories as more or less unitary, because we may
need the broad concepts to communicate. They can and should
be contested, though-especially when they implicate privilege
and subordination. This approach affects how we think about
intersectionality in two ways. It marks the privileged individual, and it exposes the multiple and relational nature of categories without trying to do away with the categories themselves. 47
B. THE MULTIPLE SELF AND THE LAW
There are a number of ways that acceptance of a fractured,
multiple, and intersectional self would change the way we
think about the law. The issue of agency and choice would
clearly be altered by moving away from the unitary self. Indeed, some have tried to hold on to the unitary self by making
the claim that we need agency and that multiplicity would destroy agency. 14 Although it may be true that we need agency,
it seems to me that a fractured and multiple self does not entail the end of agency, only the reformulation of it. If we take
seriously the claims of the constituted self, then we cannot
situate agency solely within the individual. Instead, agency
145. See generally BALDWIN, supra note 1; powell, supra note 41, at 10506.
146. powell, supra note 41, at 112-14; see also JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER
TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 147-49 (1990).

147. For a discussion of the use of categories and the law, see infra Part
IV.c.
148. Conversely, others have accepted multiplicity of the self and used it to
advocate a newfound sense of agency and self-creation:
[D]on't give me your tenets and your laws. Don't give me your lukewarm gods. What I want is an accounting with all three cultureswhite, Mexican, Indian. I want the freedom to carve and chisel my
own face, to staunch the bleeding with ashes, to fashion my own gods
out of my entrails. And if going home is denied me then I will have to
stand and claim my space, making a new culture.
GLORIA ANZALDUA, BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA. THE NEW MESTIZA 22 (1987).
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might be situated in the individual, in the intersubjective
community, and in the structure of our society. Part of the
flaw in claiming that agency dies with the individual is the assumption that if the self is fractured it must be radically determined and arbitrary. Judith Butler makes explicit this
flawed reasoning:
Paradoxically, the reconceptualization of identity as an effect, that is,
as produced or generated, opens up possibilities of "agency" that are
insidiously foreclosed by positions that take identity categories as
foundational and fixed. For an identity to be an effect means that it
is neither fatally determined nor fully artificial and arbitrary. That
the constituted status of identity is misconstrued along these two
conflicting lines suggests the ways in which the feminist discourse on
cultural construction remains trapped within the unnecessary binarism of free will and determinism. Construction is not opposed to
agency; it is the necessary sense of agency, the very terms in which
agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible. 4 9

The intersectional multiple self does not do away with agency.
It does, though, require that we reconsider our understanding
of agency.
The notion of the multiple self and the way we think about
agency clearly implicates the validity of the intent standard
used to evaluate claims of racial discrimination.15 ° This standard is problematic in any context, but is clearly inapposite in
the context of racism because it fundamentally mischaracterizes the way that racism functions within the individual and
within society. Under current jurisprudence, the claim that
someone intended to discriminate on the basis of race is interpreted as the assertion that this person engaged in the conscious thought process, "I dislike or disfavor this person because of their race, and therefore I shall behave adversely
towards them." Such a characterization of racism is clearly erroneous under any but the modern theory of the self.
As psychoanalysis asserts, unconscious thought processes
play a primary role in the interaction between the self and the
"other." Thus, "requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation... ignores much of what we understand about how
the human mind works."'' As Charles Lawrence points out,

149. BUTLER, supra note 146, at 147.
150. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring
discriminatory intent to state a racial equal protection claim under the fourteenth amendment).
151. Lawrence, supra note 106, at 323.
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psychoanalysis clarifies that the intentional/unintentional dichotomy of current discrimination jurisprudence is a false one:
Racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be
characterized as neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought-nor unintentional-in the sense
that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the
decisionmaker's beliefs, desires and wishes.'52

This misconception of how the self functions has grave repercussions. It recognizes only a small subset of racist actionsthose that can be proved to be a product of the conscious
mind-and leaves unaddressed the vast majority of racist conduct. In our current social context, where overtly racist theories are generally discredited, the vast majority of racist actions are inevitably driven by semiconscious, subconscious, or
unconscious motivations.
A related criticism of the intent standard follows from the
postmodern critique of the self as socially constructed, constituted, and shaped by social context. Given the centrality of
racism to the construction of both society and self (both minority and nonminority), any jurisprudential theory that assumes
a static, a priori self will fail to recognize the full extent to
which racist actions harm individuals and the full extent to
which intersubjective discourses and structures contribute to
the creation and perpetuation of these harms.
Current discrimination jurisprudence views racist actions
as problematic because they remove the a priori self from its
original position and treat it as if it exists at a point other than
this origin by virtue of certain insignificant appendages (i.e.,
"arbitrary contingencies") that this self possesses. Namely, the
racialized self is assigned a position that causes it to be disfavored in various otherwise fair transactions that occur within
society (e.g., applying for jobs, seeking housing, etc.). The law
remedies these transactional aberrations by returning the self
to its original and rightful position, regardless of its arbitrary
contingencies.' 53 Criticisms of the modern self recognize that
racism is a far more complex and entrenched phenomenon.
This remedial method is necessarily inadequate because it fails
to acknowledge the larger discourse that causes these certain
"arbitrary contingencies" to be consistently singled out. Also, it

152. Id. at 322.
153. Under this rubric of analysis, one understands the assertions that
historical racism and race-conscious remedies such as affirmative action are
equally abhorrent.
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fails to acknowledge the effect of this discourse on the constitution of all subjects that exist within it.
Because the postmodern self is intersubjective, and thus
dependent upon others for definition, oppression is a relational
function: "you cannot get rid of subordination without eliminating the privilege as well."' 54 In other words, contrary to current
jurisprudence, there is no original position to which we can return the racialized self.' Furthermore, because the self is relational and context-dependent, race is an "intersubjective
phenomenon" 156 whose meaning resides in a discourse outside
of the minds of particular subjects, and functions to shape
these subjects.
Because of the relational and constructed nature of the
self, the racial discourse can be described as both "self-making"
and "world-making" in that it structures both individual identities and interpersonal relations. 5 7 Put another way, race
relations are "not always about what happens between defined
groups but also involve [the] constitution of identities and
groups." 58 Thus it is critical that we examine the way we create and utilize race in our society. For example, we often think
about segregation as a limit upon the access of the excluded to
economic resources. Modern discourse views segregation as
problematic because it precludes certain individuals from
having access to certain resources and opportunities; but the
problem goes much deeper than that. As Martha Mahoney
makes evident in her description of segregation, the problem
goes to the very core of the constitution of the self and the other:
Segregation is the product of notions of black inferiority and white superiority, manifested geographically through the exclusion of blacks
from more privileged white neighborhoods and the concentration of
blacks into
subordinated neighborhoods stigmatized by both race and
59
poverty.'

154. -Grillo, supra note 8, at 18-19.
155. At least one court, however, has softened its stance on the notion of a
single original position. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (applying a "reasonable woman" standard
to a claim of memployment discrimination).
156. See DAVID ABRAM, THE SPELL OF THE SENSUOUS: PERCEPTION AND
LANGUAGE IN A MORE-THAN-HUMAN WORLD 38 (1996).

157. Toni Morrison makes this point explicit when she describes the interdependence of racial identities in the definition of the White American ethos.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
158. Mullin, supra note 82, at 22.
159. Martha Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness and Transformation,143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1995).
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Thus, segregation not only deprives the racialized self from accessing resources and opportunities, but it also plays a determinative role in the way that racialized groups are constituted,
as well as how the dominant self perceives (and justifies) this
perception of the racial "other."160 We must shift our focus to
the way the construction of Blackness and "otherness" is related to creating and maintaining the "normal" (White male)
individual. 161 As Toni Morrison does from a literary perspective, it is imperative that we look at how racial structures have
marked Whites. For instance, David Roediger and Ruth
Frankenberg suggest that it is privilege itself that creates and
maintains Whiteness. 6 2
If the law is to adequately address racism, it must acknowledge and expose the central role that racial discourse
plays in the construction of selves and our society, and the
process by which this discourse is created and sustained. This
requires recognizing that there will be strong, often unconscious, resistance to policies and actions that threaten the
stability of the dominant self by threatening the stability of
racial discourse.' 63 It also requires the fundamental recognition that racism pervades and structures our society and is not
merely present in the aberrant minds of a few racists. Finally,
the law must address the harm that racism causes by its effect
upon the development of racialized identities.'1'
What this
may require in the form of jurisprudence is uncertain, but our
current "tort model" analysis of racism is certainly inaccurate

160. As Goldberg argues, "The poverty of the inner city infrastructure
provides a racial sign of complex social disorders, of their manifestation when
in fact it is their cause." GOLDBERG, supra note 16, at 197.
16L See generally THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE
RACE, VOLUME ONE: RACIAL OPPRESSION AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1994);
MORRISON, supra note 5.
162. See generally DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF
WMTENESS (1994); Frankenberg, supra note 86.
163. The power of racial discourse in the sanctity of the self can be seen in
how "slaveholders from the 17th century onward created and politicized racial
categories to maintain the support of non-slaveholding whites, . . . convinc[ing] whites to support a system that was opposed to their own economic
interests." Crenshaw, supra note 46, at 1374.
164. It is interesting to note that some 43 years ago the law recognized the
stigmatic effect racism has upon individual development, but has failed to use
this recognition to inform its practices. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 483 (1954). The relational, constitutive self mandates that we remember
the stigma identified in Brown and also recognize the privilege that is buttressed by this stigmatization.
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and inadequate. We must reject the assumption that dominant
groups are "innocently" marked by privilege.
C. THE USE OF CATEGORIES
One convention of law and social organization that warrants mention is the use of categories. There has been much
discussion among postmodernists regarding the use of categories. Categorization plays a critical role in modernity's essentialist ordering of the self and reality. Also, language and discourse have a profound effect upon the constitution of the
subject.
Most postmodernists seem to agree, with reservations,
that categorization is a necessary tool for understanding and
organization.1 65 If we are to avoid a descent into meaningless
plurality, it is necessary that we, particularly with respect to
the law, make "claims about what we believe to be better or
worse ways of being a person." 66 Furthermore, even though we
recognize that categories are socially constructed, they nevertheless powerfully shape our experiential world and our own
sense of selves. 6 If we are to respect individuals' senses of
self, then to the extent that it is possible, we must also respect
68
the intersubjective truths (categories) that shape this self.
When we use categories, we must do so with a functional
goal in mind. We cannot "fall back on reassuring, universal
standards to justify our beliefs." 69 This requires at least two
165. Some psychoanalysts would go even further and assert that the tendency to categorize is a universal byproduct of the human need to understand
experience. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 106, at 337.
166. Flax, supra note 103, at 40. Harris has vividly illustrated this point,
stating that "avoiding gender essentialism need not mean that the Holocaust
and a corncob are the same." Harris, supra note 58, at 586.
167. David Abram provides a cogent discussion of the difference between
scientific and experiental truth, and the power of the latter despite its subjective nature. ABRAM, supra note 156, at 32.
168. Sandel makes a similar point:
The bonds between the self and (some) others are thus relaxed on the
intersubjective account, but not so completely relaxed as to give way
to a radically situated subject. The bonds that remain are not given
to physical bodily differences between human beings, but by the capacity of the self through reflection to participate in the constitution
of its identity, and where circumstances permit, to arrive at an expansive self-understanding.
SANDEL, supra note 30, at 144.
169. Id. As Haraway notes, this means that we abandon the quest for total
explanations and instead seek "making partial, real connections." Haraway,
supra note 59, at 202-03.
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internalizations. First, a category's function must be explicit:
there can be no "invisible" motive, or function masked in false
legitimacy. As Flax notes, it is necessary that the "benefits and
limitations [of the category] are always defined and take on
meaning in relation to specific purposes which we must also
specify and defend as our norms."170 Concerning race, Haraway argues that we need to reconceptualize it as a "strategic
essentialism" concerning "a certain set of political and moral
rights and obligations that are argued to arise from a certain
history."7 1 Second, in order to avoid the exclusivist and imperialist functions of universal categories, a category must be
"tentative, relational, and unstable." 7 2 We must continually
evaluate a category's viability in terms of its purpose, the
manner to which it serves its function, and the degree to which
it may serve other unintended functions. The problem with the
unitary self may extend beyond the problem of excluding normative logocentric, phallocentric requirements for inclusion.
The problem may be that modernity's goal of unity also requires the silencing of those internal voices that do not fit into
the narratives used to maintain unity and construct the self.
CONCLUSION
As I have tried to make clear, my aim in this discussion
has been to provide a sort of "critique in progress" of the self.
Building upon the earlier endeavors of Trina Grillo and others,
I have attempted not so much to advocate a particular theory,
but rather to suggest that we bear in mind certain considerations as we maneuver in the discursive void that is left by the
rejection of the modern unitary self. If we accept that the self
is relational and multiple, our efforts to address oppression
must focus upon the privileged as well as the oppressed. From
a pragmatic standpoint, we must acknowledge that subordination affects the position of the dominant and the dominated.
Postmodernists are unwittingly accepting many of the flawed
parameters and limitations of modernism. An obvious example
of this is the dichotomy of the essentialist/antiessentialist debate. Given the fundamental ramifications of reconstituting
the self, we must critique the modern self externally as well as
internally. We must not repeat the epistemological flaws of the
170. Flax, supra note 103, at 41.
171. Haraway, supra note 59, at 211.
172. Harris, supra note 58, at 586.
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modernist project. The discourse on the postmodern self will
be ongoing, with no fixed resolution on the horizon. We can
only hope that the debate is undertaken prudently and with
due respect for the great issues it affects.

